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A Distinction Without A Difference:
Vietnam, Sir Robert Thompson, and the
Policing Failures of Vietnam
Mark J. Rothermel
University of North Carolina-Wilmington
In November 1968, Captain Bill Haneke was an
army infantry officer assigned as an advisor to the Regional
Forces/Police Forces, or “Ruff Puffs” as the American
Army nicknamed them in the Bin Thuan Province. He and
twelve other advisors supervised several hundred Ruff
Puffs whose mission was to provide protection for the
South Vietnamese rural villages. The Americans had no
idea that this undisciplined and poorly trained organization
was once part of a disciplined French colonial police
organization. The same type of organization had
successfully kept French colonial possessions peaceful for
many decades. Haneke was not a policeman nor did the
United States have a colonial or constabulary-type police
force. Instead of constabulary policing, Haneke taught
infantry tactics he learned from Ranger school, including
“field cooking” a chicken.1 The camp was continually
under observation from the Viet Cong, including one night
in September where several Ruff Puff platoons defected to
the enemy. In November, as the Americans attempted to set
up defensive perimeters around their compound, Captain
Haneke was in the process of moving a fifty-five gallon
drum of aviation fuel with a phosphorus grenade the
Americans had set up when a Viet Cong sniper detonated
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the drum and sent Haneke flying eighty feet across the field
into a barbed wire fence smashing his jaw and cutting his
carotid artery.2
Captain Haneke miraculously survived the
explosion despite losing an eye, half his leg, a foot, and
having his skull crushed.3 While medical evacuation during
the American Vietnam conflict was incredibly effective,
much of the war’s execution was not. Why was Haneke, an
Army officer, serving as an advisor to a regional police
force? Instead of policing and intelligence gathering in the
rural areas like a constabulary police force, Haneke and his
team were teaching them infantry and survival tactics.
While Captain Haneke’s Vietnam service was over, the
American war continued for another seven years.
Unfortunately, with the decades of neglect and
mismanagement of South Vietnamese policing during the
Vietnam war, many of these experiences were too common.
***
The history of the American experience in Vietnam
has chronicled many experiences like Haneke’s. With
scores of young patriotic men injured or killed for few
results, writers began to launch stinging critiques against
Vietnam before the war had even ended. Just after
Haneke’s horrific wounds, David Halberstam wrote The
Best and the Brightest, a stinging rebuke of the Vietnam
war policies and strategy of President Lyndon Baines
Johnson and his administration. Halberstam blames the
disastrous war on LBJ’s micromanagement, Secretary of
State Robert McNamara’s absurd metrics of “casualty
2
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count,” and Military Assistance Command-Vietnam
(MAC-V) Commanding General William Westmoreland’s
inappropriate deployment of forces. Halberstam and his
fellow “Orthodox” historians contend the Americans effort
to defeat the North Vietnamese Communist Forces was
inevitably doomed.4
While other Orthodox historians of the war
identified compelling and strong warfighters, there was no
change to their argument of the impossibility of American
success. Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul
Vann and America in Vietnam tells the story of enigmatic
heroes like John Paul Vann, and his successful fighting in
Vietnam. Sheehan, like Halberstam, had been a Saigon
reporter in the early 60s, and saw years of disastrous
American defeat. Despite heroic Americans like Vann,
poor American leadership and corrupt South Vietnamese
governance ensured American involvement sealed
America’s fate. 5
Later historians began to differentiate the successful
warfighting of President Richard Nixon’s administration
from the Johnson failures. With new MAC-V commander,
General Creighton Abrams, the American fight became
more coordinated, and as a result accomplished many of its
objectives. Lewis Sorley highlights Abrams’s successes in
his 1999 A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and
Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. Sorley’s
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work falls squarely into a new group of Vietnam historians.
Sorley and other “Revisionists” argue that if the Americans
had conducted the war better like Abrams and his team did,
then Vietnam could have been a winnable war. 6
Another conflict that has been compared to Vietnam
is the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), in which the
British defeated a Communist insurgent population in the
colony. Military historians have asked for many years why
the collapsing British Empire could successfully defeat a
Communist insurgency in the jungles of Southeast Asia,
but the much larger American army could not. As the 21st
century War on Terror continued, a new focus on
counterinsurgency warfare began which caused scholars to
analyze past conflicts like Vietnam and compare them to
Malaya.
In this scholarship, a forgotten British officer has
come to the forefront. Sir Robert Thompson (1917-1992)
was a Royal Air Force officer in World War II, and also
served as a senior Colonial officer in the Malayan
Emergency. Thompson was credited with executing the
successful British counterinsurgency strategy that defeated
Chin Peng’s Communist Malayan National Liberation
Army (MNLA). Because of his success defeating
Communists in Malaya, the British government sent
Thompson to Vietnam in 1961 as part of the British
Advisory Mission (BRIAM) to assist the Americans and
6
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South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Thompson
was sent to advise his government’s counterinsurgency
fight against the Communist forces that had already
infiltrated South Vietnam as the insurgent Viet Cong.
Thompson advised the South Vietnamese government until
the November 1963 coup that killed Diem.7 Afterwards,
Thompson wrote several books on his experience, most
notably the trilogy on his doctrine for defeating Communist
insurgencies. In Defeating Communist Insurgency: The
Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, Thompson gives his
explanation for the British and Malayan people’s success in
defeating Chin Peng’s communists, and his assessment of
the early American advisory experience he observed.8
Thompson’s follow up book, No Exit from Vietnam gives
his insights into what he considers American missteps in
Vietnam, and offers his specific suggestions as to how to
defeat the North Vietnamese insurgency.9 His third book,
Revolutionary War in World Strategy 1945-196910 takes a
global look at all the battles against Communist insurgents,
and potential future stratagems to defeat global
Communism in the Cold War.
No Exit from Vietnam piqued the interest of
President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor,
Henry Kissinger. They invited Thompson to Washington
DC to discuss the book, and then invited him to travel to
Vietnam to give Nixon and the team his assessment of the
current strategy and how to improve it.
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The scholarship around Thompson tends to identify
how well the United States fared using Thompson’s
warfighting and political strategies. For instance, George
M. Brooke III’s two-volume doctoral dissertation, “A
Matter of Will: Sir Robert Thompson, Malaya, and the
Failure of American Strategy in Vietnam,” examines the
South Vietnamese and American’s poor execution of
Thompson’s hamlet relocation strategy (which Thompson
considered a key success in Malaya) and America lacking
the Thompsonian “will” to continue the fight.11
What the scholarship on Thompson continually
misses, however, is what Thompson himself considered the
key to defeating the insurgency. In Defeating Communist
Insurgency, Thompson identifies the Malay colonial police
as the key to defeating the Communists. The police far
outnumbered the British and Malay army forces. Even at
the height of the Emergency, the British only had twenty
thousand soldiers fighting in Malaya. The vast majority of
the patrolling and warfighting was conducted by the
police.12
This type of police is quite different than an
American concept, however. In empires like the British or
French, the “police” had a constabulary paramilitary role. A
constabulary police force’s mission was to protect the local
population and stop unrest or possibly insurrection. As
colonial powers were outnumbered compared to a local
population, the constabulary was comprised mostly of
native constables with some colonial leadership. A
constabulary unit would gather intelligence from the local
population and would conduct patrols and even get into
firefights. The most important weapon the constabulary
had, however, was its power to arrest. Acting on
Brooke, George. “A Matter of Will: Sir Robert Thompson, Malaya,
and the Failure of American Strategy in Vietnam.” PhD. diss.
(Georgetown University, 2004).
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intelligence, a constabulary could conduct a raid, arrest
insurrectionist supporters, and separate them from further
influence on a village. These ideas and techniques are not
civilian policing nor are they infantry tactics. This
paramilitary style organization is unique to imperial
policing.13
The continuing question for Vietnam historians is
why were the Americans ultimately unsuccessful in
defeating the North Vietnamese Communist insurgency?
While the Orthodox, Revisionist, and Thompsonians have
their theories, they fail to understand that the failure was
not because of military strategies, but instead the American
lack of understanding of what a constabulary police force
was. Even though Vietnam was a former French colony,
the drastic upheaval from World War II, and a rushed
transition to independence from France destroyed the years
of colonial policing knowledge. Afterwards, the ignorance
of constabulary policing from the United States
exacerbated the problems with Vietnam policing and
misguided training. Finally, a critical misunderstanding
between the Americans and Thompson himself made the
Vietnam police force useless for its critical mission which
ultimately doomed the American and South Vietnamese
mission.
***
On the morning of the 9th of March 1945, the Vichy French
Colonial forces, which prior to this moment had a relatively
peaceful World War II experience, awakened to a
nightmare. After France surrendered to Germany in 1940,
the new Vichy government still administered its colonies.
French Indochina, which the French controlled for almost a
13

Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 19, 85.

8

Spring 2021

century, continued as it had prior to the war with one
exception. Its new “ally,” the Empire of Japan, was able to
garrison its forces there and use its ports. All of this
changed as Germany went into full retreat in Europe.
Japan, in an effort to keep the offensive against the allies,
executed “Operation Bright Moon.” They immediately
surrounded and captured all French administrators and
military to take full control of Indochina. Fifteen-thousand
French and Indochinese soldiers and Gendarmerie
(France’s colonial police force) were captured. The
Japanese tortured and beheaded almost a third of its
prisoners. Without weapons or reinforcements from France,
those who escaped had to traverse hundreds of miles of
jungle and mountains to reach China. As French diplomat
Jean Sainteny lamented years later in retrospect, “[The
coup] wrecked a colonial enterprise that had been in
existence for 80 years.”14
***
French Indochina
Prior to South Vietnam’s formation, the French
gained control of Indochina in a series of battles that by
1893 gave them Annam, Tonkin, Cochinchina, Cambodia,
and Laos. During this time France administrated these
independent protectorates through local kings or emperors.
After the March 1945 coup, however, the Japanese created
the “independent” Empire of Vietnam (Annam, Tonkin,
Cochinchina), Kingdom of Kampuchea (Cambodia), and
the Kingdom of Luang Phrabang (Laos). 15
With the coup, the Japanese destroyed all of the
French colonial infrastructure, most notably the
Gendarmerie. These forces, commanded by the French, but
Chandler, David. “Legacies of World War II in Indochina.” Legacies
of World War II in South and East Asia. Edited by David Koh Wee
Hock, (Institute of South East Asia Studies, 2007): 24.
15
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mostly comprising local populations, provided protection
for the local population through policing. Most importantly,
as Sir Robert Thompson stressed, it acted as the first line of
defense against native population insurrections.16 With
these vital groups gone, Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) and his
Viet Minh independence movement took advantage of their
previous American support from the Office of Strategic
Services and the weak emperor of Vietnam, Bao Dai, to
declare independence. With the Japanese defeat and retreat
from Indochina, however, France was determined to
reclaim its colony.
France did not return to their colony status quo
antebellum, however. All of the administrative state and
police forces had been murdered or forced to flee. Their
defeat at the hands of the Japanese also created a perception
of French weakness amongst the populace. As French
academic, Paul Mus, who escaped from Hanoi at the launch
of the coup remarked, “French Colonialism had been blown
out of history.”17 No longer were the French seen as
invincible. As the French attempted to put Bao Dai in
charge of Vietnam again, Ho and the Viet Minh expanded
their insurrection movement. The hastily rebuilt French
colonial administration could not prevent Ho’s movement
from growing in popularity amongst the population. With
the Haiphong incident, war began between Ho’s forces and
the French and South Vietnamese forces.18
As the French searched for a way to preserve their
influence in Indochina, they quickly worked to gain favor
with the loyal Vietnamese forces as well as mollify the
Americans (who were financially supporting the French
war effort) and their anti-colonial sentiment. France signed
16
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the Elysée Accords in 1949 with South Vietnam. This
agreement gave increased autonomy to the Vietnamese for
self-rule. While this limited autonomy was unpopular with
the Vietnamese, the one overlooked but critical issue was
that the former colonial police forces were disbanded and
replaced by a South Vietnamese controlled Civil Guard.19
The difference between British and French actions
in 1949 could not have been more disparate. In Malaya, Sir
Robert Thompson and the British forces were investing
training and energy in the Malayan colonial police
preparing it to suppress the growing Communist threat.
Meanwhile, in Indochina, the French completely
dismantled its Gendarmerie. Perhaps from the weakened
administrative state from the coup, France ignored its
previous success in suppressing insurrections in its other
colonies like Algeria. Regardless of the reason, the result
was catastrophic. Vietnam being forced to police itself
ultimately impaired its ability to govern. After a few years,
it became clear South Vietnam needed a functioning police
force, and it certainly seemed logical for the country that
was funding the war to provide this training. In 1955, the
U.S. Vietnam policing experience began.
***
U.S. Army Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, the
commander of Military Assistance Advisory Group
Vietnam (MAAG-V) was apoplectic. “Whoever sold Diem
this idea is nuts!” he wrote to a colleague.20 President Ngo
Dinh Diem, South Vietnam’s President wanted the new
Civil Guard to be comprised not only of 55,000 troops, but
also tanks and helicopters for “subduing riots” or to
19
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“disperse a mob.”21 When a Vietnamese general was tasked
with drawing up the plan for this newly reorganized Civil
Guard, he simply copied U.S. Army task organizations he
found. This plan of Diem’s was completely different from
the one State Department Vietnam mission leader Leland
Barrows and his team had devised a few years earlier.
General Williams and the rest of the MAAG group
assumed Diem was attempting to create his own private
army.22
***
The U.S. Policing Effort
After the Elysée accords, the vestiges of the French
colonial forces continued in little more than name. There
were 54,000 men in the Civil Guard, which was the
paramilitary colonial style police force, 7000 in the
municipal police, and 3500 in what was called the
“Vietnam Bureau of Investigation.” No one had any idea
how many Gendarmerie there actually were or if they were
part of the Civil Guard numbers. There was also a “Self
Defense Corps” originally designed as a reserve police
force that had 50,000 members.23 What these units had in
numbers, they completely lacked in training and
equipment. Most of the Self Defense Corps was without
weapons, and what weapons they had were antiquated
French rifles with little ammunition.
While the lack of equipment was troubling, the
incoherence of the organization was the most problematic.
21
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A seasoned officer with colonial experience, like Sir Robert
Thompson, probably would have recognized the vestiges of
an old colonial police force. At this time, unfortunately,
Thompson was fighting Chin Peng and the Malay
Communists. One negative of the American anticolonial
ethos was that this constabulary-type structure made little
sense to Americans. In 1955, after the French had signed
the Geneva Accords and left Indochina, Lieutenant General
Williams and his MAAGV team focused their advisory and
financial support away from the French and directly
towards the newly independent Republic of Vietnam’s
(South Vietnam) government and military affairs.
Williams’s priority was preparing the South Vietnamese
Army (ARVN) for what many feared was the impending
attack across the 17th parallel by the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA). As the Korean War ended only three years
earlier, the Americans were convinced that with the
establishment of the divided Vietnams, any Communist
attack would be a conventional attack south. With Williams
and Diem focused on building up the conventional ARVN
forces (building up to seven divisions), there was a debate
regarding the police.24 With Williams focused on building
up the Army, the police building was left to the State
Department’s Leland Barrows and his Mission to
Vietnam.25
Leland Burrows was a career government official
who had previously served the Truman administration.
From 1949-1958, he led the U.S. Mission to Vietnam. 26
The Mission’s role was to advise and build the
infrastructure of Diem’s new independent government.
When it came to the police force, there was some debate as
to who would rebuild the current forces. Barrows and the
24
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American team insisted that the police forces needed to be
organized under the Ministry of the Interior, not the
Ministry of Defense.27 Most likely, American distaste for
colonial rule and the current intense Gendarmerie fighting
in French Algeria led the Americans to insist on a more
civilian focused form of policing. In 1955, Barrows sent a
police advisory group to South Vietnam from Michigan
State University.
The Michigan State team established a national
police training academy and basic structure to the new
Civil Guard. From 1949 to 1958, Barrows led the U.S.
Mission to Vietnam. Instead of Thompsonian paramilitary
tactics and intelligence gathering like the kind deployed by
the Malayan Colonial Police, the Civil Guard was trained to
operate like “The Pennsylvania State Police.”28 Williams
was skeptical of Barrows’s strategy and described them as,
“Police types who do not see the big picture.”29 Diem was
also critical of the new Civil Guard organization. Being a
civilian style police force was the last thing a volatile new
country like South Vietnam needed. He vehemently stated
to the Americans that Vietnam was “not Michigan.” 30
If Diem or Williams had somehow wrestled police
control from Barrows, there is little evidence that the
Vietnamese police would have been dramatically
transformed into a Thompsonian-style constabulary police
force. While Diem and General Williams saw the natural
complement of the Civil Guard to the Defense Ministry,
they did not envision a true paramilitary force. Williams
simply saw armed forces as military units. Barrows’s
27
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Michigan team envisioned an American police force.
Neither could comprehend the organization as a
constabulary force. They simply did not understand the
principles of constabulary fighting that Sir Robert
Thompson stressed.
There is some revisionist discussion that U.S. Air
Force Colonel Edward Lansdale advocated for a
“counterinsurgency force” to defeat an insurrection in the
South.31 Lansdale, who had worked in Vietnam as a French
advisor and CIA operative, had made many claims
criticizing the French bombings as well as the overall
MAAG strategies. His charges are not consistent with the
facts, however. Lansdale claimed that counterinsurgency
was not known during this time (ignoring Thompson and
the Malayan Emergency). Thompson made no mention of
Lansdale’s work in Vietnam, nor are there any documents
suggesting there was an alternate plan to the Michigan
State team that was considered. As later historic
scholarship determined, the Michigan State team was also
comprised of CIA personnel. The lack of coordination of
policing strategies with Lansdale seems unlikely.32
As the insurgency inside South Vietnam intensified,
American and South Vietnamese policy makers realized
that an impending North Vietnamese assault across the 17th
parallel was not likely. The Viet Cong Communist
insurgency was the largest threat to the South Vietnamese
government. After the Geneva Accords in 1954, most
Catholics and other non-Communist supporters of Diem
moved into South Vietnam. Ho’s Viet Minh supporters in
the South, however, did not move North. The southern
Communists formed the Viet Cong forces to conduct
guerilla operations. With this new threat, Americans
31
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repurposed the Civil Guard. The Barrows initiative of
civilian policing was abandoned. This adjustment,
however, proved just as ineffective.
To create a force to defeat the Viet Cong, the Civil
Guard and the Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) were
combined into a large force in 1959. Diem’s desire for a
private army might have been unrealistic, but it was not
without merit. During this Civil Guard transition, Diem was
overthrown in 1963 and killed. After the coup, the new
Civil Guard was turned into the Regional Forces. The
ineffective and ill-equipped Self Defense Guard became the
Popular Forces. These two groups were combined into one
chain of command for the RFPF. Nicknamed “Ruff Puffs”
by the Americans, their mission was to fight the Viet Cong
in rural areas.
With the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, the
American effort in Vietnam escalated. MAAG became
MAC-V, and its new commander General William
Westmoreland led the effort in the fight against the North
Vietnamese. Americans began to deploy the Ruff Puffs in
insurgent campaigns against the Viet Cong. After the failed
Barrows civilian plan, and having total ignorance of
colonial police tactics, the Americans used the Ruff Puffs
like any other infantry unit. Instead of constabulary experts
like Thompson, Captain Haneke and other Infantry officers
were assigned to train them. These units conducted infantry
patrols and learned infantry tactics from the American
advisors. With no experience in constabulary-type work,
the Americans trained the Ruff Puffs in what they knew:
infantry tactics. While the Ruff Puffs were still separate
from the ARVN organization, the manner by which they
differed in mission from the ARVN or the U.S. Army was a
distinction without a difference.
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Besides the Americans’ inability to train
paramilitary forces, there was another systemic issue with
the Ruff Puffs. Because of Diem and General Williams’s
priority to defend South Vietnam from a Korean war-style
attack across the DMZ, all of South Vietnam’s best men
joined the army.33 The civilian ministries and police forces
received the second-tier men, and units could not avoid
Communist infiltration. After years of disappointing results
and an inability to pacify the South’s rural areas, the Ruff
Puffs were combined into the ARVN organization in
1970.34
Whether creating a Michigan police force, or a
group of mediocre infantrymen, there was little chance of
success for creating a true Thompsonian counterinsurgency
force. Both the MAAG-V and State Department Mission
had no comprehension of what the French colonial forces
provided as the system had been dismantled years before.
Diem’s ideas of a more militaristic guard, ideas probably
poorly translated from Thompson, were met with suspicion
and lack of understanding. The binary decisions of civilian
or military for the police forces provided no flexibility,
which was essential in disrupting the counterinsurgency.
The American anticolonial tradition and lack of
constabulary forces simply did not allow the Americans a
chance at success.
***
Sir Robert Thompson had been advising and observing
American actions in Vietnam for several years. Thompson
was fascinated by American strategies in South Vietnam
and how they did not result in success. As he stressed the
33
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need for intelligence, one general remarked to him, “Let’s
go out and kill some Viet Cong, and then we can worry
about intelligence!”35 The Americans were not afraid to try
new things and spend money. Expenditures in Vietnam
were over ten times what the British spent in Malaya. Yet
the results were not leading to success. This reality finally
led to Sir Robert Thompson’s infamous charge: “The
trouble with you Americans is that whenever you double
the effort you somehow manage to square the error.” 36
***
Sir Robert Thompson
Sir Robert Thompson began his career in the Royal
Air Force at Cambridge and was commissioned as a
Reserve officer in 1936. As he studied and prepared for the
impending war with Germany, he chose a career in the
Colonial Service which required an extra year of schooling
at Oxford. The Colonial Service assigned young Robert
Thompson to the British colony of Malaya. He was then
sent to Macao, a Portuguese colony, to learn Cantonese. As
the British began fighting Germany in 1940, Thompson and
other Colonial Service students were to continue their
Chinese studies in Hong Kong. As Japanese bombers began
attacking Hong Kong on December 8th, Pearl Harbor was
attacked simultaneously on the other side of the dateline.
The British war now had a second front in the Pacific.37
With some beginning Cantonese proficiency, and travel
passes signed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek,
Thompson and other cadets were forced to evade and fight
their way into mainland China. After connecting with
35
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Chinese guerrilla and former Hong Kong police forces,
Thompson was able to join the Chindit operations as a
Royal Air Force officer serving under legendary British
officer Orde Wingate. Thompson participated in Burma’s
irregular operations and was an instrumental part of the
Chindit team that helped disrupt Japanese operations in
Burma. 38
After World War II, Thompson resumed his
Colonial Services career in Malaya. During the war, the
Japanese occupied Malaya. The Chinese Malayans, along
with some British fighters, spent the war fighting the
Japanese in the jungles. The Chinese formed the Malayan
People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) to defeat the
Japanese, and after the war, the British reestablished their
colonial rule over Malaya. Despite the disarming and
disbanding of the MPAJA, many Chinese Malayans,
inspired by Mao Zedong’s Communist movement were
motivated to rebel against British rule. The MPAJA’s
wartime leader, Chin Peng, took control of the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) and began violent attacks against
Malays and British residents. In 1948, after the murders of
several rubber plantation European managers, the British
Malay government declared a State of Emergency, and the
12-year conflict known as The Malayan Emergency
officially began.39
The MCP successfully attacked key British targets,
and even assassinated the Malayan High Commissioner
Henry Gurney. Ultimately, the British were able to defeat
the insurgency through the leadership of General Sir Gerald
Templer. Thompson, who had worked implementing the
counterinsurgency strategy, cataloged all of the successful
key metrics the British achieved. By 1960, the MCP had
38
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surrendered, and the Malayan Emergency was an
impressive victory in counterinsurgency for Great Britain.40
Thompson detailed the important factors that led to
the success of the British counterinsurgency, many of
which were surprising to conventional military strategists.
For instance, he argued that the guerilla fighters were not
the important factor to defeat in a counterinsurgency.
Instead, determining and interrupting the underground
networks of the population was paramount.41 To achieve
this goal, Thompson stressed gaining proper intelligence.
He also determined that the key fighters in Malaya were the
police force, not the military. When the Malay police
would patrol an area and gather intelligence on potential
MCP insurgents, the police could then arrest those
individuals. While removing an insurgent from battle was
effective, the more important achievement, Thompson
argued, was keeping the local population safe from
violence. With a minimal British troop deployment, they
were able to determine when they wanted to engage the
MCP and did not aimlessly meander through the jungle
searching for the enemy. With their proper intelligence and
patrols gathered from the Malay police, British patrols
pushed the MCP away from the rural population
eliminating opportunities for Communists to gain rural
control.42
Another important strategy Thompson noted, was
the concentration of friendly forces. Rural villages away
from police support were targets for the MCP. Thompson
and the British created a strategy of moving entire villages
into more protected areas. While this tactic seemed
extreme, most villages were only moved around three miles
Thompson, “Emergency in Malaya,” 83.
Thompson Defeating Communist Insurgency, 30.
42
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from their previous location, and the new areas were
concentrated together for better police protection.43 An
additional strategy that Thompson considered important,
was the targeting of key insurgent infrastructure by
ambushing supply routes. For Thompson, preventing
insurgent resupply missions was more important than
winning any insurgent battle.44
Arguably the most important point in
counterinsurgency, Thompson stressed, was patience. The
insurgents had to understand that the government forces
were not going to leave quickly. In Malaya, Thompson
noted that the British resolve brought Chin Peng to the
negotiating table with the government. When Chin Peng
realized the British, and after 1958, the independent Malay
government, were not going to stop their counterinsurgency
campaign, the Emergency ended with the MCP’s defeat.45
Because of Thompson’s success in Malaya, British Prime
Minister Harold MacMillan sent Thompson and the
BRIAM team to South Vietnam as an advisor to President
Diem and the Americans.46 Thompson’s counsel should
have been a perfect complement to the fiercely antiCommunist Diem and the well-funded and equipped U.S.
military.
When Thompson began to advise the South
Vietnamese government, he attempted to implement the
hamlet resettlement plan for Diem’s government. Despite
his advice, it was a disaster. Rather than concentrating
villages and only slightly moving them, the Diem
government moved hamlets far away from their previous
locations and also spread them too far from each other.47
By ignoring the key parts of the Thompson strategy
(concentrating friendly hamlets, and keeping villages near
43
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their original location), the South Vietnamese made the
villagers less safe and impossible to patrol. Another unique
issue to Vietnam compared to Malaya was Vietnam’s lack
of political stability. Despite the American financial and
political support, Diem’s regime grew less effective and
ultimately was overthrown in 1963. The Americans took
over responsibility of the Vietnam war in 1964, and the
BRIAM team returned to England.48
With the Americans in command of the war effort,
Thompson’s concern about “squaring the error” became
reality. Hamlet resettlements were even more haphazard
and spread out when done by the US Marines.49 Instead of
having a light footprint of foreign troops like the British in
Malaya, Americans deployed over 200,000 Americans to
fight the Vietnamese communists. Having no constabulary
intelligence gathering like Thompson had stressed, the
Americans instead implemented a “search and destroy”
strategy which simply allowed the NVA to choose where
and when to fight.50 By 1968, the Americans were in an
endless war of attrition on the ground supported in the air
by a largely ineffective bombing campaign.
After General Creighton Abrams became
commander of MAC-V in June 1968, the American
strategy changed dramatically. As new ambassador to
South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker noted that instead of
discussing the “political war” or “air war,” there became
“one war.” The Barrows/Stewart fights from the 1950s
were over.51 The larger “search and destroy” missions were
replaced with an emphasis on holding territory. Thompson,
noting the changes from England, wrote his book No Exit
48
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from Vietnam celebrating the new Abrams strategy. This
book attracted the attention of the new Nixon
administration National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.
Kissinger, impressed with Thompson’s success in Malaya
defeating Communists, invited him to Washington to
discuss the U.S. strategy.52 After the meeting, Thompson
was invited to further meetings regarding Vietnam
withdrawals. He was also invited to tour Vietnam and give
his assessment on the ground.
Sir Robert Thompson assembled a team of advisors
and travelled to Vietnam in February and March of 1971 to
give his assessment of the American war effort. It is
noteworthy that Thompson on his trip to Vietnam did not
bring other British soldiers. Instead, he brought his
colleagues from Malaya who administered the winning
police force work. Sir Richard Catling, W. L. R. Carbonell,
J. H. Hindmarsh, and D. S. Palmer were all experts and
leaders in British Colonial policing who were part of the
Malayan police force during the Emergency. After the trip,
Thompson and his team produced a detailed report on what
would be needed for the South Vietnamese to be successful
in Vietnam. His focus was on reforming the National
Police.53
In Thompson’s March 1971 Report on the National
Police Republic of Vietnam, Thompson evaluated the state
of the National Police and offered 157 specific suggestions
for reforms. What Thompson and his team most identified
was the National Police’s intelligence gathering failure.54 In
Malaya, Thompson noted the police were the main
intelligence gatherers. It was imperative that the police
could identify insurgent supporters, arrest, and remove
them from the population. Thompson proposed a regional
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police control reorganization to ensure they patrolled the
rural areas properly to keep insurgents away from the
hamlets. Interestingly, in the National Police history,
Thompson ignored all of the Michigan State work, and only
briefly discussed the original French organization.55 He
gave specific instructions for how the Police should assist
the Armed Forces and gather “intelligence related to
subversion and terrorism.”56
For as much of an expert as Thompson was in
counterinsurgency, it is noteworthy that he did not relate
how much the former French Indochina colonial police
force had strayed from its original mission. He only briefly
mentioned the “administrative and training problems” that
the force faced.57 Perhaps it was an effort not to upset the
Americans as he was only an invited guest. He worked hard
to ingratiate himself to Abrams by dining and creating a
personal relationship with him before offering his criticism,
so he may have seen no need to discuss in detail the
previous American folly.58
The report was analyzed by the Americans. A
month later (April 1971), Ellsworth Bunker and the State
Department team provided a detailed response to
Thompson’s report.59 Bunker’s memo evaluated the report
based on several priorities of timing and feasibility:
A: Is and should be implemented
B: Is and should be implemented in part
C: Should be implemented
D: Should be implemented, but infeasible
E: Should not be implemented
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As well as four different categories for timing of
implementation: 1) Currently, 2) Short Term (Within one
year), 3) Mid Term (Over one year), and 4)
Indeterminant.60 Items 15-36 of Thompson’s suggestions,
which related directly to the police strategic
recommendation for patrolling and intelligence gathering
for the war effort, were grouped together, and rated with a
very optimistic “B” and “Short Term.” The comments,
however, suggested a less optimistic tone:
“These organizational concepts reflect British
Colonial influences. They do not adequately
consider the background of Vietnamese concepts,
the residue of French Colonial influence, and
approximately 15 years of U.S. influence on police
matters.”61
In a few sentences of bureaucratic jargon, the
American Vietnam War was perfectly encapsulated. An
assembly line of errors had been created: First, the French
abandoned Vietnam and left behind a dysfunctional
colonial police force, then the Americans attempted to
create something unnecessary and not adaptable to the
country, followed by an advisor missing the fundamental
problems. Thompson repeatedly touted the Malayan police
as the key to defeating the MCP, yet years later he never
mentioned the American and South Vietnamese failure in
the police development.62
Both the Orthodox and Revisionist schools have
filled volumes in libraries criticizing American mistakes in
Vietnam. Whether on policy or strategic level, finding
errors in judgement or execution has never been difficult.
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Sorley and the Revisionist school have emphasized the
successes of the American war in Vietnam after 1968 and
suggested that if the Abrams strategy had been pursued
more consistently, they could have prevailed in the conflict.
Attempting to understand which ignored plan or strategy
might have produced better results, or which advisor or
strategy should not have been ignored is a perpetual
challenge. For every Sir Robert Thompson, who advised
two governments and had successfully executed a
counterinsurgency strategy, there are others like Colonel
Edward Lansdale who claim they were the vox clematis
despite having limited experience in counterinsurgency
warfare. For any losing effort, there is no shortage of
people who retrospectively had the solution.
Sir Robert Thompson is different, however. He had
successfully defeated a Communist insurgency. He had
tangible plans and results that winning governments could
follow to defeat an enemy. His scholarship on
counterinsurgency and five principles for success against
an insurgency are still studied today.63 British military
historian Alexander Alderson recently evaluated the British
strategies in Iraq using Thompsonian doctrine to measure
efficacy.64 Other Vietnam scholarship measures the
efficacy of hamlet resettlement or political will. There is no
question that the Thompsonian school will continue to
flourish. Thompson was prolific in writing doctrine, was
willing to share his ideas, and had no specific axes to grind.
As a foreign advisor and not a member of the South
Vietnamese or U.S. governments, his voice remains one of
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the most objective regarding evaluation of the Vietnam war
effort.
Clearly, Thompson is not without fault regarding
Vietnam strategy, however. His assessment of the
contemporary state of the police force did not directly
address the use of the police as infantry units which he
specifically criticized in Defeating Communist
Insurgency.65 Thompson brought an entire team of colonial
police experts to South Vietnam to evaluate the National
Police, yet he chose not to address the American
dismantling of a constabulary model directly. After
attempting to create an American-style police force, the
Regional Forces had been trained and converted into
infantry units. Americans simply saw the forces as a binary:
a unit is either a military force or a civilian police force.
Even the leader of the Territorial Forces General in
Vietnam, General Ngo Quang Truong, considered the force
he commanded a military force. In his 1981 after action
report, he discussed military battles, and his report rarely
mentioned any sort of policing. It reflected the total
conversion from the Barrows or the previous gendarmerie
model into an infantry unit.66
Increased scholarship today notes the constabulary
skills deficit in modern American peacekeeping. National
security expert, Robert Perito discusses in Where is the
Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a
Postconflict Stability Force67 America’s need to create a
Thompsonian-type constabulary force to ensure a
previously hostile foreign country can be pacified after the
fight. Thompson’s work will continue to be the framework
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for governments and historians to determine the correct
way to implement future peacekeeping strategies.
Hopefully, this paper will create further scholarship
regarding the breakdown of proper policing in Vietnam.
Thompsonian scholarship continues to be an important area
of focus on the Vietnam war, and in evaluating past and
future counterinsurgency warfare. His principles establish
an effective benchmark for evaluating this type of warfare.
It is important, however, to not create a hagiographic
portrayal of Thompson as regards his Vietnam advisory
work. The failure to establish a proper constabulary police
force was from a confluence of abandonment by the
French, American misapplication of home-style policing,
and the South Vietnamese being at the mercy of ineffective
instruction. Thompson deserves criticism as well for not
turning the focus of the counterinsurgency on proper
deployment of the Vietnamese police. The casualties of
these policing mistakes were monumental and tragic.
Captain Haneke and many other misdirected soldiers were
irrevocably hurt by this catastrophic strategic failure.
Sir Robert Thompson addresses in his books that
policing was the British key to success in the Malayan
Emergency. If Thompson’s doctrine is the fundamental
teachings for counterinsurgency warfare, as most scholars
who have studied him argue, then the focus for Vietnam
Thompsonian historians should be on the policing failures
in the Vietnam war, and why Thompson himself seemed to
ignore his own advice. Rather than using Thompson as
merely a framework for counterinsurgency evaluation,
military scholars should determine why the man who
developed the doctrine of counterinsurgency decided to
dismiss the central tenets in the years that followed.
Constabulary policing in counterinsurgency is clearly not
just infantry patrolling or peacekeeping. Until scholars
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address the differences, future Vietnam scholarship may
offer new theories on America’s failure, but these theories
will continue to have distinctions without differences.

